This is the Time for Democracy Development Programs, Not to Turn our Back on Democrats around the World

Let’s not throw out democracy development programs yet.

In recent weeks protests have developed in Venezuela  over the lack of freedom of speech and the effects of Maduro’s policies. In Turkey, Twitter users are fighting to maintain their freedom of speech in the run up to elections.  And Ukrainian citizens engaged in protest to achieve the final ouster of their authoritarian president Viktor Yanukovich. In these events there is clear evidence that grass roots efforts are being put forth for democracy development.

However, over the past few years, some authors have come out against soft diplomacy and turned against democracy development programs. Most recently, former UK Minister for Europe Dennis McShane made the case for hard diplomacy at the expense of development and cultural programs, arguing that these have not helped the movement of authoritarian governments such as China or “the Stans” toward democracy.

Research on the influence of democracy development programs overall paints a much less bleak picture. International aid helped Georgia move to more democratic institutions and supported groups, like the student movement Otpor in Serbia, to oust dictators like Slobodan Milosovic. It changed the governance system of a failed authoritarian regime in Indonesia, and helped citizens in the Former Soviet Union and the Middle East find their voices against entrenched regimes.

In an assessment of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) democracy programs, Finkel et al. estimated the amount of U.S. funding for democracy development (in year 2000 dollar equivalents) had risen from $128 million to $817 million between 1990 and 2003. During that same period according to Freedom House, which offers a yearly assessment of democratic development in more than 190 countries, the number of electoral democracies increased from 76 to 117. By 2006 that number was up to 123.  Finkel concluded that the programs had “significant, albeit modest, impact on democratic outcomes as measured by both Freedom House and Polity IV scores.” He further noted that international factors had an influence on development of democracy. It is significant that the number of democracies skyrocketed during a period when the liberal democracy became broadly seen as the only legitimizing mechanism for governance. It's also significant that cracks in this process began appearing when the democracy's strongest proponent the U.S. became economically weaker, was perceived as more hawkish and was broadly seen as losing its own democratic institutions.

 In 2007 the number of electoral democracies began to decrease. By 2008, the Economist's Intelligence Unit's annual democracy index report noted that there had been “few further advances and several setbacks” in the third wave of democratization. This, however, does not point to a failure of democracy development aid. Rather it indicates the influence of several international factors:

1) Attempts by the US government to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan through the use of military force, and the occurrence of the color revolutions resulted in a backlash against democracy promotion efforts. Examples include Russia's requirement for NGOs receiving funding from foreign governments to register as foreign agents, and Uzbekistan’s and Belarus's limiting the amount of foreign funding allowed to local NGOs.

2) Stronger authoritarian governments, such as Russia and China (particularly through The Shanghai Cooperation Organization), began exerting more influence. Concomitantly, a growth in adjectival democracies—communist democracy, Islamic democracy, and managed democracy—developed during the period, each supported by authoritarian states and providing an alternative to the liberal democracy promoted by the U.S. and EU.

3) China’s rise and the U.S. and Europe’s recessions (and slow recovery) have provided an alternate narrative for development than that supported by the “West” since the fall of the Soviet Union. Since winning the Cold War, the United States has pushed the idea of a connection between democratization and economic development. On the other hand, China's meteoric rise has seemed an example for many authoritarian leaders that these two processes can be decoupled, making it easier for them to argue that their primary goal is economic development and democratization would follow after the completion of this process.

Each of these have influenced democracy development around the world. But they do not mean that the U.S. and Europe should give up the goal of supporting democratization. Rather if a changed international environment is standing in the way of democratization, then at least a portion of the solutions may reside in that environment. 

Overcoming the economic problems in the U.S. and EU is a part of it. Thomas Carothers, President of the Council on Foreign Affairs, has mentioned in his book Aiding Democracy Abroad that the key to a strong foreign policy begins with getting things in order at home.

A more difficult task will be overcoming the damage done by efforts to democratize by force. Once efforts of democracy development become connected to the attempt of maintaining political and economic hegemony in the international sector, programs and the international NGOs that run them become suspect in the eyes, not only of local governments, but also civil society actors. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, activities by various groups have blurred the lines between international aid workers and political-military actors

Recent spying scandals brought to light by NSA leaker Edward Snowden may further feed the distrust of U.S. efforts for openness and democracy development.

Last is the need to understand the authoritarian governments’ descriptions of alternative routes for developing governance and the overlap with opposition groups, not simply as a failure to grasp the concepts of democracy or to cling cynically power but as concepts filtered through context and cultural logic. To further democracy development, scholars and democracy development professionals need to examine the discursive structures, logic and historical perspectives of such descriptions to better understand the context in which programs are being conducted. Democracy development projects, then, could include discourse and narratives as guidelines and indicators.

Such an examination in the Former Soviet Union will reveal the influence of elite theory since the fall of the Soviet Union and the role of the intelligentsia in the national movements during the Soviet era, and will provide a way to inderstand the barriers to democracy development in the region. An understanding of this history and logic will show the political implications of the following statement by Rustam Ibrahimbeyov, famous Soviet filmmaker who sought to challenge Azerbaijan President in the 2013 elections as the candidate for the National Council of Democratic Forces, “In Azerbaijan, the primary mechanism (without which a nation cannot live) was broken. Every nation exists because of its elite.” The logic behind this statement--the primacy of the elite in society--can stand in the way of democratization and would have to be taken into consideration by democracy development programs. Political scientist Daniel Kelleher has argued, “Unless intellectuals can overcome [the conflict between intellectuals and less educated groups in the opposition] and accept less educated people as full citizens and allies, a democracy movement is unlikely to emerge.

 There is evidence that the analysis of discourse, logic and narratives, as I am recommending here, can be used in development programs.  The Center for the Study of Narrative and Conflict Transformation envisions conflict as a “narrative process in which the creation, reproduction and transformation of meaning itself is a political process …”  Understanding democratization in the same manner , and integrating this perspective into programs alongside the traditional institutional indicators of democracy could provide the knowledge needed to identify why democratization has not taken place in some countries and what can be done to overcome challenges. Given the movement of some countries away from democracy in recent years, and the tenacity with which some groups, like those in Ukraine, Venezuela and Turkey, cling to democratic ideals, a closer look at the opportunities this perspective provides would be highly beneficial to international democracy development programs.