A Note to Congress: Why for Post-Soviet Countries, Russia’s Occupation of Crimea is not just Ukraine’s Problem

By Kerry A. Cosby

While the U.S. legislature squabbles over a bill to provide financial aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia for its military actions, citizens and governments in the Former Soviet Union watch closely to see what they can expect from the U.S. in the case that Russia invades their own countries. A weak show of support could have broader repercussions for U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Since the escalation of the Maidan protests, social media in the Former Soviet Union have included non-stop speculation about what would happen next. The arrival of Russian forces in Crimea redoubled the discussion, and added a new direction: when will this happen to us?

For citizens of these countries, Crimea is more evidence of Russia’s nostalgia for lost power and its desire to bring the post-Soviet space back under its control.  In a March 1 Facebook post, Farhad Aliyev, Azerbaijani political scientist and visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies noted, “One should not underestimate that Mr. Putin already got accustomed (due to the West’s passiveness) to act with impudence in post-Soviet Eurasia, considering this region his sole ‘domain,’ which sooner or later (in one or other configuration) will be subjugated.”

Aliyev’s concern (and that of many in the Former Soviet Union) comes from the fact that, since Putin’s rise to power in 2000, the government’s actions and rhetoric have been increasingly neo-imperialist, seeking to restore influence in its “Near Abroad,” or its “sphere of national interest.”

Russia’s Sphere of National Interest

The governments of the Former Soviet Union navigate a narrow and difficult space between Russia, and Europe and the United States, with varied levels of interactions with both.

Since the fall of the Soviet state, Russia has considered the former republics its area of influence, and has viewed any movement of Europe or the United States into the region with suspicion. The color revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2005) appeared to Russia to be a direct challenge to its influence. Russia claimed that the United States and Europe sought through their support for democratization efforts to weaken Russia and advance their own foreign policy agendas.

Following the revolutions, the countries made statements of desire to accede to the European Union, and showed interest in becoming members of NATO. In subsequent years, the countries’ relationships with Russia deteriorated significantly.

In April 2006, Russia’s government banned the sale of Georgian wines because of their containing pesticides and heavy metals. However critics claimed that the ban was punishment for the country’s Western orientation.

In 2008, relations between Georgia and Russia hit their lowest point. After Georgian forces had entered the breakaway republic of South Ossetia in August 2008, Russia sent troops into Tskhinvali and increased its military presence in Abkhazia. Then over the next five days, Russian troops continued to extend their control of the country until a peace agreement was finally brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Neither of those regions are currently under the control of Georgia.

The Soviet Legacy of Separatism

Soviet policy helped create separatist movements in the new republics of the region through its simultaneous development of an overall civic identity (the Soviet Man) and its creation of a hierarchical ethnic based federalism. In the years following the collapse of the Soviet state, without the overarching ideology of Communism, the remaining republics sought to create nations based on the concept of ethnic nationality that was available to them. With many of these countries’ being multi-ethnic states, such policies created an element of fear and animosity between the titular nationalities and the smaller ethnic groups previously provided a level of autonomy under the Soviet system.

Many of the autonomous regions developed into separatist movements. In Ukraine, separatism developed in Crimea. In Moldova, it was in the Transdniester Moldovan Republic. In Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  And in Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh. 

Many observers in the region believe that Russia employs separatism as a method of maintaining control of the countries in its sphere of influence. Former President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili said in an interview with Ukrainian reporters, “Putin is employing the ready-made script he used previously in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniester Moldovan Republic.”

Central Asia

The concerns in Central Asia are similar to those mentioned by Saakashvili, however they have not exploded into conflict like in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan.

In 1997, Kazakhstan moved its capital from Almaty to a village in the north Akmola (present day Astana) with the official reasoning of the threat posed by seismic activity and the inability to expand due to the mountain range that the city butted up against. However, proponents of the move also argued that there was a potential threat of separatism in the northern part of the country, where Russians made up more than half of the population.  Although Russia had never made claims on the territory, it had vowed—as it had with Crimea—to protect the Russian-speakers living in the region. And in 1999, 22 people (11 Russian citizens) were arrested in the North-eastern city of Ust-Kamenogorsk on suspicion of plotting a separatist coup to set up a Russian Altai Republic.

Recently the topic of Russian influence in Central Asia grew into a scandal, when the Vice-Chair of the Russian Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky described his vision for the region on Rossiya 24 television station: “There are no republics in Central Asia. There is a Federal region with its main city Vernii! Today it’s known under a different name, Almaty—my home city. All of these were made up—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. They are the Central Asian Region. “

Disquieted by the statements, the Government of Kyrgyzstan requested an explanation from Russia’s Foreign Ministry.

Russian Nationalism and Expansion

Zhirinovsky’s announcement about Central Asia was paralleled in another calling for Nogorno Karabakh to become a part of Russia as a means of solving the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Many view Zhirinovsky as a marginal figure in Russian politics, but this intense nationalism and desire to take control of the former Soviet territories have become much more mainstream since the invasion of Crimea and have possibly influenced Putin’s increase in popularity.

Where Does this Leave the U.S. and E.U.?

In a multi-polar world, the United States and Europe can no longer expect that their statements will simply be heeded by Russia, but they also cannot bury their heads in the sand and think that the aggression will go away. The post-Soviet social media universe has been filled with comparisons of Putin’s occupation of Crimea to Hitler’s of Czechoslovakia—posting and reposting Hitler’s famous speech.

Though the criticism may be directed at Putin as an aggressor and occupier, it indirectly accuses the U.S. and Europe as appeasing yet another dictator who is poised to gobble up its neighbors.

 For this reason, the United States government needs to carefully weigh its actions. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War was a major blow to U.S. credibility in the region. Playing games with support for Ukraine now sends the message to the people and governments of the region that the U.S. can’t be counted on to back the countries if the they take a stance that angers Russia. If this becomes the prevailing view, it will be difficult for a future U.S. president to expect support for an initiative that might challenge Russia’s interest or stance on an issue, and that narrow space the Former Soviet countries currently inhabit will shrink with Russia filling the gap where any independent action might previously have been found.