This is the Time for Democracy Development Programs, Not to Turn our Back on Democrats around the World

Let’s not throw out democracy development programs yet.

In recent weeks protests have developed in Venezuela  over the lack of freedom of speech and the effects of Maduro’s policies. In Turkey, Twitter users are fighting to maintain their freedom of speech in the run up to elections.  And Ukrainian citizens engaged in protest to achieve the final ouster of their authoritarian president Viktor Yanukovich. In these events there is clear evidence that grass roots efforts are being put forth for democracy development.

However, over the past few years, some authors have come out against soft diplomacy and turned against democracy development programs. Most recently, former UK Minister for Europe Dennis McShane made the case for hard diplomacy at the expense of development and cultural programs, arguing that these have not helped the movement of authoritarian governments such as China or “the Stans” toward democracy.

Research on the influence of democracy development programs overall paints a much less bleak picture. International aid helped Georgia move to more democratic institutions and supported groups, like the student movement Otpor in Serbia, to oust dictators like Slobodan Milosovic. It changed the governance system of a failed authoritarian regime in Indonesia, and helped citizens in the Former Soviet Union and the Middle East find their voices against entrenched regimes.

In an assessment of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) democracy programs, Finkel et al. estimated the amount of U.S. funding for democracy development (in year 2000 dollar equivalents) had risen from $128 million to $817 million between 1990 and 2003. During that same period according to Freedom House, which offers a yearly assessment of democratic development in more than 190 countries, the number of electoral democracies increased from 76 to 117. By 2006 that number was up to 123.  Finkel concluded that the programs had “significant, albeit modest, impact on democratic outcomes as measured by both Freedom House and Polity IV scores.” He further noted that international factors had an influence on development of democracy. It is significant that the number of democracies skyrocketed during a period when the liberal democracy became broadly seen as the only legitimizing mechanism for governance. It's also significant that cracks in this process began appearing when the democracy's strongest proponent the U.S. became economically weaker, was perceived as more hawkish and was broadly seen as losing its own democratic institutions.

 In 2007 the number of electoral democracies began to decrease. By 2008, the Economist's Intelligence Unit's annual democracy index report noted that there had been “few further advances and several setbacks” in the third wave of democratization. This, however, does not point to a failure of democracy development aid. Rather it indicates the influence of several international factors:

1) Attempts by the US government to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan through the use of military force, and the occurrence of the color revolutions resulted in a backlash against democracy promotion efforts. Examples include Russia's requirement for NGOs receiving funding from foreign governments to register as foreign agents, and Uzbekistan’s and Belarus's limiting the amount of foreign funding allowed to local NGOs.

2) Stronger authoritarian governments, such as Russia and China (particularly through The Shanghai Cooperation Organization), began exerting more influence. Concomitantly, a growth in adjectival democracies—communist democracy, Islamic democracy, and managed democracy—developed during the period, each supported by authoritarian states and providing an alternative to the liberal democracy promoted by the U.S. and EU.

3) China’s rise and the U.S. and Europe’s recessions (and slow recovery) have provided an alternate narrative for development than that supported by the “West” since the fall of the Soviet Union. Since winning the Cold War, the United States has pushed the idea of a connection between democratization and economic development. On the other hand, China's meteoric rise has seemed an example for many authoritarian leaders that these two processes can be decoupled, making it easier for them to argue that their primary goal is economic development and democratization would follow after the completion of this process.

Each of these have influenced democracy development around the world. But they do not mean that the U.S. and Europe should give up the goal of supporting democratization. Rather if a changed international environment is standing in the way of democratization, then at least a portion of the solutions may reside in that environment. 

Overcoming the economic problems in the U.S. and EU is a part of it. Thomas Carothers, President of the Council on Foreign Affairs, has mentioned in his book Aiding Democracy Abroad that the key to a strong foreign policy begins with getting things in order at home.

A more difficult task will be overcoming the damage done by efforts to democratize by force. Once efforts of democracy development become connected to the attempt of maintaining political and economic hegemony in the international sector, programs and the international NGOs that run them become suspect in the eyes, not only of local governments, but also civil society actors. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, activities by various groups have blurred the lines between international aid workers and political-military actors

Recent spying scandals brought to light by NSA leaker Edward Snowden may further feed the distrust of U.S. efforts for openness and democracy development.

Last is the need to understand the authoritarian governments’ descriptions of alternative routes for developing governance and the overlap with opposition groups, not simply as a failure to grasp the concepts of democracy or to cling cynically power but as concepts filtered through context and cultural logic. To further democracy development, scholars and democracy development professionals need to examine the discursive structures, logic and historical perspectives of such descriptions to better understand the context in which programs are being conducted. Democracy development projects, then, could include discourse and narratives as guidelines and indicators.

Such an examination in the Former Soviet Union will reveal the influence of elite theory since the fall of the Soviet Union and the role of the intelligentsia in the national movements during the Soviet era, and will provide a way to inderstand the barriers to democracy development in the region. An understanding of this history and logic will show the political implications of the following statement by Rustam Ibrahimbeyov, famous Soviet filmmaker who sought to challenge Azerbaijan President in the 2013 elections as the candidate for the National Council of Democratic Forces, “In Azerbaijan, the primary mechanism (without which a nation cannot live) was broken. Every nation exists because of its elite.” The logic behind this statement--the primacy of the elite in society--can stand in the way of democratization and would have to be taken into consideration by democracy development programs. Political scientist Daniel Kelleher has argued, “Unless intellectuals can overcome [the conflict between intellectuals and less educated groups in the opposition] and accept less educated people as full citizens and allies, a democracy movement is unlikely to emerge.

 There is evidence that the analysis of discourse, logic and narratives, as I am recommending here, can be used in development programs.  The Center for the Study of Narrative and Conflict Transformation envisions conflict as a “narrative process in which the creation, reproduction and transformation of meaning itself is a political process …”  Understanding democratization in the same manner , and integrating this perspective into programs alongside the traditional institutional indicators of democracy could provide the knowledge needed to identify why democratization has not taken place in some countries and what can be done to overcome challenges. Given the movement of some countries away from democracy in recent years, and the tenacity with which some groups, like those in Ukraine, Venezuela and Turkey, cling to democratic ideals, a closer look at the opportunities this perspective provides would be highly beneficial to international democracy development programs.

A Note to Congress: Why for Post-Soviet Countries, Russia’s Occupation of Crimea is not just Ukraine’s Problem

By Kerry A. Cosby

While the U.S. legislature squabbles over a bill to provide financial aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia for its military actions, citizens and governments in the Former Soviet Union watch closely to see what they can expect from the U.S. in the case that Russia invades their own countries. A weak show of support could have broader repercussions for U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Since the escalation of the Maidan protests, social media in the Former Soviet Union have included non-stop speculation about what would happen next. The arrival of Russian forces in Crimea redoubled the discussion, and added a new direction: when will this happen to us?

For citizens of these countries, Crimea is more evidence of Russia’s nostalgia for lost power and its desire to bring the post-Soviet space back under its control.  In a March 1 Facebook post, Farhad Aliyev, Azerbaijani political scientist and visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies noted, “One should not underestimate that Mr. Putin already got accustomed (due to the West’s passiveness) to act with impudence in post-Soviet Eurasia, considering this region his sole ‘domain,’ which sooner or later (in one or other configuration) will be subjugated.”

Aliyev’s concern (and that of many in the Former Soviet Union) comes from the fact that, since Putin’s rise to power in 2000, the government’s actions and rhetoric have been increasingly neo-imperialist, seeking to restore influence in its “Near Abroad,” or its “sphere of national interest.”

Russia’s Sphere of National Interest

The governments of the Former Soviet Union navigate a narrow and difficult space between Russia, and Europe and the United States, with varied levels of interactions with both.

Since the fall of the Soviet state, Russia has considered the former republics its area of influence, and has viewed any movement of Europe or the United States into the region with suspicion. The color revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2005) appeared to Russia to be a direct challenge to its influence. Russia claimed that the United States and Europe sought through their support for democratization efforts to weaken Russia and advance their own foreign policy agendas.

Following the revolutions, the countries made statements of desire to accede to the European Union, and showed interest in becoming members of NATO. In subsequent years, the countries’ relationships with Russia deteriorated significantly.

In April 2006, Russia’s government banned the sale of Georgian wines because of their containing pesticides and heavy metals. However critics claimed that the ban was punishment for the country’s Western orientation.

In 2008, relations between Georgia and Russia hit their lowest point. After Georgian forces had entered the breakaway republic of South Ossetia in August 2008, Russia sent troops into Tskhinvali and increased its military presence in Abkhazia. Then over the next five days, Russian troops continued to extend their control of the country until a peace agreement was finally brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Neither of those regions are currently under the control of Georgia.

The Soviet Legacy of Separatism

Soviet policy helped create separatist movements in the new republics of the region through its simultaneous development of an overall civic identity (the Soviet Man) and its creation of a hierarchical ethnic based federalism. In the years following the collapse of the Soviet state, without the overarching ideology of Communism, the remaining republics sought to create nations based on the concept of ethnic nationality that was available to them. With many of these countries’ being multi-ethnic states, such policies created an element of fear and animosity between the titular nationalities and the smaller ethnic groups previously provided a level of autonomy under the Soviet system.

Many of the autonomous regions developed into separatist movements. In Ukraine, separatism developed in Crimea. In Moldova, it was in the Transdniester Moldovan Republic. In Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  And in Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh. 

Many observers in the region believe that Russia employs separatism as a method of maintaining control of the countries in its sphere of influence. Former President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili said in an interview with Ukrainian reporters, “Putin is employing the ready-made script he used previously in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniester Moldovan Republic.”

Central Asia

The concerns in Central Asia are similar to those mentioned by Saakashvili, however they have not exploded into conflict like in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan.

In 1997, Kazakhstan moved its capital from Almaty to a village in the north Akmola (present day Astana) with the official reasoning of the threat posed by seismic activity and the inability to expand due to the mountain range that the city butted up against. However, proponents of the move also argued that there was a potential threat of separatism in the northern part of the country, where Russians made up more than half of the population.  Although Russia had never made claims on the territory, it had vowed—as it had with Crimea—to protect the Russian-speakers living in the region. And in 1999, 22 people (11 Russian citizens) were arrested in the North-eastern city of Ust-Kamenogorsk on suspicion of plotting a separatist coup to set up a Russian Altai Republic.

Recently the topic of Russian influence in Central Asia grew into a scandal, when the Vice-Chair of the Russian Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky described his vision for the region on Rossiya 24 television station: “There are no republics in Central Asia. There is a Federal region with its main city Vernii! Today it’s known under a different name, Almaty—my home city. All of these were made up—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. They are the Central Asian Region. “

Disquieted by the statements, the Government of Kyrgyzstan requested an explanation from Russia’s Foreign Ministry.

Russian Nationalism and Expansion

Zhirinovsky’s announcement about Central Asia was paralleled in another calling for Nogorno Karabakh to become a part of Russia as a means of solving the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Many view Zhirinovsky as a marginal figure in Russian politics, but this intense nationalism and desire to take control of the former Soviet territories have become much more mainstream since the invasion of Crimea and have possibly influenced Putin’s increase in popularity.

Where Does this Leave the U.S. and E.U.?

In a multi-polar world, the United States and Europe can no longer expect that their statements will simply be heeded by Russia, but they also cannot bury their heads in the sand and think that the aggression will go away. The post-Soviet social media universe has been filled with comparisons of Putin’s occupation of Crimea to Hitler’s of Czechoslovakia—posting and reposting Hitler’s famous speech.

Though the criticism may be directed at Putin as an aggressor and occupier, it indirectly accuses the U.S. and Europe as appeasing yet another dictator who is poised to gobble up its neighbors.

 For this reason, the United States government needs to carefully weigh its actions. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War was a major blow to U.S. credibility in the region. Playing games with support for Ukraine now sends the message to the people and governments of the region that the U.S. can’t be counted on to back the countries if the they take a stance that angers Russia. If this becomes the prevailing view, it will be difficult for a future U.S. president to expect support for an initiative that might challenge Russia’s interest or stance on an issue, and that narrow space the Former Soviet countries currently inhabit will shrink with Russia filling the gap where any independent action might previously have been found.